



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Report of Investigation

REPORT BY: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

FILE NO: 2405-C-118-B--15882111171250

PERIOD OF REPORT: 27 Apr 09 - 1 Sep 11

DATE OF REPORT: 4 Sep 11

SUBJECT: AHMED GUL; Male Born: 1965, Bldg 100, Afghan National Army, Kubal International Airport (KAIA), Afghanistan (AFG); Tarakhil, District 4, Taimani Street 2, Kabul, AFG

DECEASED: TARA RENEICE BROWN, NEE: TARA RENEICE JACOBS, Female Born: 21 Jul 77, NY, E-7, SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TDY to 438th Air Expeditionary Advisor Squadron (AEAS) (AFCENT); KAIA, AFG; from Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI); Andrews AFB, MD

DAVID LAWRENCE BRODEUR, Male Born: 10 Dec 76; MA, O-4, SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TDY to 438th Air Expeditionary Advisor Wing (AEAW) (AFCENT); KAIA, AFG; from 11th Air Force (PACAF); Elmendorf AFB, AK

FRANK DIEHL BRYANT Jr., Male Born: 13 Aug 73, TN, O-5, SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TDY to 438 AEAS, (AFCENT); KAIA, AFG; from 56th Operations Group (ACC); Luke AFB, AZ

NATHAN JAY NYLANDER, Male Born: 23 Jan 76, IL, O-3, SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TDY to 438th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group (AEAG) (AFCENT); KAIA, AFG; from 25th Operational Weather Squadron (ACC); Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ

CHARLES ANTHONY RANSOM, Male Born: 4 May 79, VA, O-3, SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TDY to 438 AEAS (AFCENT), KAIA, AFG; from 83rd Network Operations Squadron (ACC); Langley AFB, VA

JEFFREY ONIAL AUSBORN, Male Born: 1 Aug 69, AL, O-4, SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TDY to 438 AEAS (AFCENT); KAIA, AFG; from 99th Flying Training Squadron (AETC); Randolph AFB, TX

PHILIP DAVE AMBARD, Male Born: 4 Apr 67, Venezuela, O-4, SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TDY to 438 AEAG (AFCENT), KAIA, AFG; from 460th Space Communications Squadron (AFSPC); Buckley AFB, CO

RAYMOND GRAY ESTELLE, Male Born: 16 Jan 71, CT, O-4, SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TDY to 438 AEAG (AFCENT); KAIA, AFG; from Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC); Langley AFB, VA

JAMES ALOYSIUS MCLAUGHLIN Jr., Male Born: 16 Jun 55, PA, Civ., SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAW (ACENT); KAIA, AFG



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

INCIDENT	OFFENSE DESCRIPTION	SUBJECT	VICTIM
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	BROWN, TARA R
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	BRODEUR, DAVID L
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	BRYANT, FRANK
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	NYLANDER, NATHAN
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	RANSOM, CHARLES
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	AUSBORN, JEFFREY
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	AMBARD, PHILIP
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	ESTELLE, RAYMOND
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	MCLAUGHLIN, JAMES

STATUS: Closed

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

COL, USAF

Commander, AFOSI 24 EFIS



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

DISTRIBUTION:

438 AEAS/CC, KAIA, AFG (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
438 AEAG/CC, KAIA, AFG (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
438 AEAW/CC, KAIA, AFG (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
11 AF/CC, Elmendorf AFB, AK (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
56 OG/CC, Luke AFB, AZ (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
25 OWS/CC, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
83 NOPS/CC, Langley AFB, VA (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
99 FTS/CC, Randolph AFB, TX (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
460 SCS, Buckley AFB, CO (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
HQ ACC, Langley AFB, VA (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
HQ Air Force, Pentagon, DC (Info) (w/Exhibits 1-40, 42-81).....1
AFME, Dover AFB, DE (Info) (w/Exhibits).....1
File (w/Exhibits).....1

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. This document is subject to a claim of privilege under military law. Handle in accordance with AFI 71-101, Volume 1.~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION	1
NARRATIVE	2
Background	2-1
Interviews	
Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-2
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-3
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-4
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-5
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-6
Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-7
Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-8
SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-9
PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-10
MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-11
Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-12
Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-13
Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-14
MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-15
MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-16
Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-17
TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-18
Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-19
Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-20
Re-Interview of Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-21
PO3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-22

Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-23
Lt Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-24
Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-25
SMSgt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-26
Capt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-27
MSgt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-28
CMSgt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-29
Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-30
Lt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-31
Capt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-32
Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-33
KIP	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-34
LAL	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-35
Lt Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-36
Sgt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-37
Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-38
	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-39
MSgt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-40
	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-41
Lt Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-42
Lt Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-43
Col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-44
Capt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-45
	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-46
Lt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-47

Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-48
PO1 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-49
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-50
Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-51
Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-52
Soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-53
MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-54
Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-55
Re-Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-56
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-57
Re-Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-58
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-59
Re-Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-60
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-61
Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-62
Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-63
Soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-64
Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-65
Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-66

Searches

Crime Scene Search	2-67
Crime Scene Search	2-68
Crime Scene Search	2-69
Crime Scene Search	2-70
Crime Scene Search	2-71
Crime Scene Search	2-72

Crime Scene Search	2-73
Document Reviews	
Passport of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-74
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID	2-75
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID	2-76
Memorandum for Record (MFR) for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-77
MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-78
Translation of a JDEC-A Kabul Document	2-79
MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-80
MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-81
MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-82
MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-83
MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-84
MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-85
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID	2-86
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID	2-87
MFR from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-88
MFR from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-89
SUBJECT's Autopsy Report by the Ministry of Public Health	2-90
Bldg 101 Floor Plan Provided by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-91
MFR from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-92
Questionnaire Answered by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-93
3-D Diagram of the ACCC	2-94
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to Afghan CID	2-95
Timeline of Events from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-96

MFR from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-97
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID	2-98
Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID	2-99
Report of the Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation at KAIA	2-100
Firearms Lab Analysis Report	2-101
Autopsy Reports, Toxicology Reports and Death Certificates of the Active Duty DECEASEDs	2-102
Financial Records, SUBJECT	2-103
DNA Lab Analysis Report	2-104
Cellex Data Reports	2-105
Autopsy Report, Toxicology Report and Death Certificate of DECEASED (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-106
MFR from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-107
Gunshot Residue Lab Analysis Report	2-108
Firearms Lab Analysis Report	2-109
Law Enforcement Records Checks	
Intelligence Information Systems, SUBJECT	2-110
Consultations	
Forensic Science Consultation	2-111
Forensic Science Consultation	2-112
Forensic Science Consultation	2-113
Polygraph	2-114
Acquisition	2-115
Other Investigative Aspects	
Initial Notification	2-116
Retrieval of Initial Crime Scene Photos	2-117
Evidence Retrieval from the French Medical Center	2-118

Evidence Retrieval from Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-119
Evidence Retrieval from Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-120
Evidence Retrieval from SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-121
Evidence Retrieval from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-122
Evidence Retrieval from Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-123
Briefings to Senior Leaders	2-124
Evidence Retrieval from (b)(6)	2-125
Buccal Swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-126
Buccal Swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-127
Buccal Swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2-128
CJ2 Exploitation Reports	2-129
Coordinations	
Investigations and Operations	2-130
Investigations and Operations	2-131
Autopsy	2-132
EVIDENCE	3
EXHIBITS	4

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 27 Apr 11, AFOSI Expeditionary Detachment 2405, Bagram Air Field (BAF), Afghanistan (AFG) was notified that at approximately 1010 hours on 27 Apr 11, SUBJECT entered the Air Command and Control Center (ACCC) in the Headquarters (HQ) Afghanistan National Air Force (ANAF), Kabul International Airport (KAIA), Kabul, AFG, and shot and killed eight U.S. Air Force (USAF) members and one civilian contractor.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Through witness statements, AFOSI determined SUBJECT acted alone during the following chain of events. On the morning of 27 Apr 11, DECEASED BRODEUR, DECEASED BRYANT, DECEASED AUSBORN, and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN were in the ACCC to conduct the daily 1000 hours scheduling meeting that took place each Saturday through Wednesday. The DECEASEDS were mentors for Afghan personnel, to include SUBJECT, assigned to the ACCC. DECEASED AMBARD, DECEASED RANSOM, DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED ESTELLE had just arrived to the ACCC to receive training from DECEASED AMBARD on a communications encryption system. DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED ESTELLE were on temporary duty (TDY) to KAIA and arrived the day prior to receive the necessary training to take back to their deployed locations to implement. DECEASED BROWN was in the ACCC because DECEASED BROWN worked for DECEASED AMBARD and wanted to learn as many communication systems she could. SUBJECT entered the ACCC with his issued Smith and Wesson 9 millimeter (mm) pistol on his belt holster. SUBJECT pulled out his pistol and opened fire. SUBJECT shot each of the Americans in the room multiple times, including one shot to each of the DECEASEDS' heads, except DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN. The investigation was unable to reveal who SUBJECT shot first. All DECEASEDS died at the scene except DECEASED BROWN; American first responders transported her to the French hospital emergency room where she died. Some of the individuals at the ACCC for the scheduled meeting were in the conference room adjacent to the ACCC when SUBJECT started to shoot. The individuals in the conference room fled into the hallway and out of the HQ ANAF Building. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), 440th Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron (AEAS), KAIA, AF, and Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS, KAIA, AF, stood guard with their weapons drawn. Once all the individuals were out of the room, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the conference room. DECEASED NYLANDER returned and assisted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). As SUBJECT exited the main door of the ACCC, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED NYLANDER fired at SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then exited the HQ ANAF Building using the front entrance. First responders found DECEASED NYLANDER just outside of the rear glass doors of the HQ ANAF Building. SUBJECT received gunshot wounds during the exchange of gunfire with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED NYLANDER. SUBJECT then wrote in blood on opposite walls of the hallway, "God is one" and "God in your name" in Dari (an AFG dialect). SUBJECT went up the stairway in the main lobby to the G-2 intelligence office on the second floor. SUBJECT fired a round into one of the closed doors from the G-2 reception area. SUBJECT sat down on a couch and inflicted two apparent self-inflicted gunshot wounds to his torso and chest. Lab results on SUBJECT's camouflage uniform blouse were consistent with the upper left chest shot being at close/intermediate range.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interviews of SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) revealed SUBJECT and his (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) lived in Pakistan for approximately 18 months between 2006 and 2008 and returned to AFG and military service approximately three years prior. SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know why SUBJECT killed the Americans, but did say he had a mental condition as a result of a helicopter crash in approximately 1996.

(U//~~FOUO~~) SUBJECT's co-workers said SUBJECT was routinely late to work but his superiors did not have any disciplinary problems with him. One co-worker said SUBJECT would get very angry at seemingly minor problems; however, none of the co-workers believed SUBJECT was a religious radical.

NARRATIVE

Background

2-1 (U//FOUO) This investigation was initiated on 27 Apr 11, at approximately 1130 hours based upon information received by Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Combined Joint Intelligence Human Intelligence (CJ2X), Kabul International Airport (KAIA), Afghanistan (AFG), of a shooting at an Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) compound on KAIA, AFG.

Interviews

2-2 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Air Command and Control Center (ACCC), Headquarters (HQ) Afghanistan Air Force (ANAF) Building (Bldg) 101, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/ Bldg 101, ACCC, KAIA, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), EDET 2405, Bagram Airfield (BAF), AFG; SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) EDET 2405, BAF, AFG

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a planner who DECEASED BRODEUR mentored in the ACCC, worked on his daily tasks when a linguist identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group (AEAG), KAIA, AFG, asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to come and speak with DECEASED BRODEUR. The discussion pertained to a flight task that (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) failed to pass the task to the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the conversation was not an argument just a discussion. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said DECEASED BRODEUR tried to see what he could to ensure (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) passed the tasks to the intended individuals. While the three discussed the topic, SUBJECT entered the room and stood behind (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED BRODEUR for approximately three to four minutes and listened to the discussion. SUBJECT remained quiet and appeared to be normal. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remembered SUBJECT's facial expression turned to anger and he pulled an unknown type of gun from the front upper portion of his Afghan National Army (ANA) uniform top. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT shot and killed DECEASED BRODEUR first. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dove to the floor and pretended to be dead. SUBJECT continued to move and shoot around the room and when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard SUBJECT leave the room, he got up and dove under the conference table located in the northern end of the ACCC. SUBJECT returned to the ACCC and continued to fire approximately four more rounds. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled cell phones ringing and he turned his off so not to draw attention to where he hid. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see SUBJECT because (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hid his face and was scared to move. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) thought he heard SUBJECT walk south down the hallway so he got up from under the conference table and went into the cipher room at the northwest corner of the ACCC and locked the exterior and interior door. After an unknown amount of time passed ANA guards entered the room and started to kick the door (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was behind. After the ANA guards and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke several sentences through the locked door, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) unlocked the door and the ANA guards escorted him out.

2-3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/Bldg 10 Ward 3, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 1

(U//FOUO) On 28 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who worked in the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the second floor of Bldg 101 verbally and in a written statement (attached) detailed the following information with the assistance of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (AKA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Linguist. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to work on 27 Apr 11, at 0700 hours, in the Operational Section of the G-2 Intelligence Office in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked in the room where first responders found SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

stated he first learned of the incident because of the sounds of gunfire in the Bldg. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remained in his office, located in the south end on the second floor of Bldg 101, until a rush of people ran into the office yelling "Here he comes, here he comes." Everyone in the office thought it was a suicide bomber. An unidentified individual in the office broke the window and instructed people to jump out the window. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) jumped from the window and broke his right leg when he landed on the ground. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) helped (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the ANA clinic where they treated his injury.

2-4 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Parf 3 Khais Khaish, Kabul, AFG
 Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/Role 3 Hospital, KAIA, AFG
 Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 2

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the assistance of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) which related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(D) arrived to his at approximately 0710 hours on 27 April 2011. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked in the G-2 office located on the second floor of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated a rush of people came into the office and then he heard a gunshot, as people yelled there was a suicide bomber. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) moved into a smaller office located in the G-2 office and waited approximately three to four minutes before he moved a desk in front of the small office door. SUBJECT opened the main door to the office and yelled "Intelligence, where is Intelligence?" (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then heard one gunshot and jumped out the window in the small office. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way to the ANA clinic where the clinic treated him for a sprained ankle.

2-5 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Queen Elizabeth Hospital - Woolwich, Stadium Road, London, United Kingdom (UK)
 Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/US Embassy (USEMB), 24-36 Grosvenor Square, London, UK
 Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), DET 541, London, UK and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Assistant Legal Attaché, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), USEMB, London, UK

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a self identified distant (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) member, provided the following information regarding SUBJECT: SUBJECT drank alcohol, partied, and was not a religious person. In the late 1980s, SUBJECT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and became more religious. In 1991, when the Mujahedeen were in AFG, SUBJECT's religious practices remained the same. In 1995, SUBJECT started to follow the teachings of the Taliban, becoming a very strict Muslim. He attended Mosque for each prayer time, grew a beard, had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and practiced an authoritarian approach when seeing other individuals who did not practice Islam to his liking. In 2001, the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started to see SUBJECT as the "chameleon" he was because he would change his attitudes to suit his surroundings. SUBJECT was very authoritarian but would change depending on who he was interacting with. During this time, SUBJECT wanted to relocate with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to a northern European country. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed this might have been Norway, but it did not happen and SUBJECT moved (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to Hayatabad, Pakistan (PK). SUBJECT stated that he moved to PK because he was upset that foreigners had invaded his country. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall if SUBJECT wanted to do anything to retaliate; he just wanted to get away from AFG. When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) members asked SUBJECT why he wanted to return to AFG to work for the AFG government, SUBJECT responded he "wanted to kill Americans." The (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not take any action on this statement as they did not believe it.

(U//FOUO) In 2007, when SUBJECT lived in military housing in Hayatabad, PK, SUBJECT developed a very close relationship with an unidentified prominent figure who SUBJECT met at a local Mosque. SUBJECT was a frequent visitor to the Mosque, attending daily prayers five times each day. During that time, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT's attendance at the Mosque radicalized him. SUBJECT always had

religious ideals but they increased during this time. Also at this time, there were rumors in (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that SUBJECT wanted to become a suicide bomber. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not believe him due to his "chameleon" like attitude. Sometime in 2008, SUBJECT moved with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) back to AFG. When asked by the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) why he was going back he replied "he wanted to kill Americans." Again, the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) members did not believe him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that SUBJECT appeared to relax his religious attitudes but still argued his religious opinions with members of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as well as others. He cut his beard, stopped wearing his headdress and acted as though he embraced the ideas of the current Karzai administration.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) usually only saw SUBJECT during social gatherings with the rest of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that since 2001, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had concerns about SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT showed signs of depression but was not schizophrenic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) based this on what he observed of SUBJECT and what (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told him about SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) felt that something happened to SUBJECT while he was in PK and attended the local Mosque.

(U//FOUO) In response to questions regarding SUBJECT's financial situation, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) advised SUBJECT sold his residence one year ago in order to pay off some debts. Previously, SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not own a vehicle but purchased one with the remaining proceeds from the sale of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) house. SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) lived in this vehicle, which was parked at another (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) residence.

(U//FOUO) On the morning of 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) telephoned multiple (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and learned of the shooting. During the phone calls, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned that the night before the shooting, SUBJECT had prayed all night and cleaned his gun. In the morning, SUBJECT departed without saying anything to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2-6 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group (AEAG), KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for AFG, Base Hospital, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 3

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) that related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a linguist for three ACCC mentors, DECEASED BRYANT, DECEASED BRODEUR, and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 4th Fighter Wing (FW), Seymour Johnson AFB, NC. On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got to work at approximately 0815 hours and read the news on the computer located on the southeast side, front row of the ACCC. At approximately 1000 hours, DECEASED BRODEUR with an ANA soldier, later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from the north end of the ACCC and asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to translate for them. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) faced the main door to the ACCC, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) faced the front (south) of the ACCC, and DECEASED BRODEUR stood to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left, facing (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The discussion pertained to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who received a flight tasking from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and passed the information to his boss, later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instead of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted this conversation was, in no way, an argument between the two individuals. While (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) translated for the two individuals, SUBJECT entered the ACCC via the main door from the hallway at the south end of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SUBJECT looked normal when he entered the room and did not speak to anyone. SUBJECT walked approximately ten feet into the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw SUBJECT's facial expression get very mad. At this same time, SUBJECT pulled his black pistol from his right side holster located on his waist and started to shoot in the direction of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED BRODEUR, who stood in the middle of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) quickly fell to the floor and believed he hit his arm on something as he felt a sharp pain. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) realized later that SUBJECT shot

him in his left arm. SUBJECT moved quickly into the room while shooting continuously in multiple directions. Once SUBJECT walked passed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) quickly ran out the main exit of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not believe SUBJECT observed him leave nor did he think SUBJECT shot in his direction while he ran out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran outside of the main entrance located on the west side of Bldg 101.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had not seen SUBJECT prior to the time SUBJECT walked into the room and started to shoot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know SUBJECT well but knew SUBJECT greeted people when he saw them. SUBJECT was not very sociable around the ACCC.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the following individuals were in the ACCC at the time of the incident: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the room the entire time and received a shot in the arm and stomach. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said the time and day when many US mentors and other people were within the ACCC was everyday at 1000 hours when the scheduling meeting took place.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see what happened to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) or DECEASED BRODEUR once SUBJECT began to shoot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also did not see SUBJECT shoot anyone while he was in the room prior to running out.

2-7 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Aircraft Maintenance Section, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/Ward 3, ISAF Base Hospital, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who had very little interactions with the DECEASEDs and SUBJECT provided a verbal statement with the assistance of linguist (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at Bldg 101, ANSF Compound, KAIA, AFG, at approximately 0700 hours and did not see SUBJECT there. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated 1000 hours was a busy time within the ACCC because of the daily meeting in the adjacent conference room. The meeting was to discuss the flight missions for the upcoming day.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 1005 hours, SUBJECT entered the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see SUBJECT as he was doing his computer training and had learned to filter out all the other people within the room. SUBJECT shot one round and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked up from his computer to see where it came from. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw SUBJECT with a black handgun, aimed at some of the mentors as SUBJECT fired another shot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not identify the mentors who SUBJECT shot with the first two rounds. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) crawled under his desk to hide from SUBJECT, as did (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linguist, KAIA, AFG. An unidentified mentor to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tried to hide with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) but SUBJECT saw the mentor, came over and shot him (later identified as DECEASED ESTELLE). Once SUBJECT shot the mentor, SUBJECT aimed at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and shot him in the arm and stomach, with one shot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) played dead so SUBJECT would not shoot him again. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not believe SUBJECT targeted mentors because SUBJECT shot him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT shot all the rounds in one magazine and reloaded before he started to shoot the second magazine. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT expended at least two magazines within the ACCC before he left. SUBJECT left the ACCC and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard gunshots in the hallway outside of the ACCC. When the shots were distant, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) closed the doors to the hallway and conference room so SUBJECT could not re-enter if he wanted to. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then proceeded to the northern end of the ACCC to hide behind a huge AFG map along with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linguist, KAIA, AFG. When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to the map, he noticed approximately four Americans lying on the floor. Once he was behind the map, he heard what he described as painful breathing from approximately three mentors but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not point out and

identify who the mentors were. While (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was behind the map, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got up from the floor and ran into the cipher room at the rear of the ACCC and locked the door. Shortly after ANA quick response force (QRF) went to the main ACCC door and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opened it. The ANA QRF cleared the room and escorted the Afghans out of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to the hospital. His gunshot wound went through his wrist and skimmed his stomach. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said SUBJECT was never at work and had no personal ties within the section. SUBJECT had only worked in the section for approximately three months.

2-8 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 316 Wing, Andrews AFB, MD
Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a helicopter flight scheduler, worked with DECEASED BRYANT on mentoring ideas provided the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the Rotary Wing Commander who helped advise the ANAF helicopter pilots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) addressed an issue dealing with the ANAF prior to the incident. A new process within the ACCC was being developed to ensure ANAF flights were officially tasked through a legitimate ANAF process rather than the current process of the ANAF leadership dictating what flights go where, possibly directing flights for personal gain or illegitimate purposes. On 25 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pulled U.S. mentors off of ANAF missions because they were not properly scheduled and it did not fit the process for tracking flying hours and maintenance. On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) talked to DECEASED BRYANT about an upcoming mission in which the ANAF 11th District Commander wanted to fly around to all their checkpoints. DECEASED BRYANT suggested cutting the ANAF fuel, so ANAF could only fly scheduled missions and if they wanted to fly on their own they would have to pay for the fuel.

2-9 SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 156 Military Police Det, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 4

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the following: On 27 April 2011, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was off work and began his out-processing from the base when he heard an alarm. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to his office to see if he could help and met up with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CJ2X ISAF Command, KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to go to the ANA side of the base because there was an attack in progress. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) and TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) all drove to the ANA compound. Once they arrived at the compound the Belgian QRF let them proceed into the area where the attack took place. They arrived at Bldg 101 and noticed a large number of ANA soldiers and civilians standing around the front of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed broken glass and bullet holes in the windows of the front of the building. The personnel in (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) vehicle exited and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded into the building with the French Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team. Once inside an ANA Colonel (NFI) confirmed that there were seven US members killed in action (KIA) inside the building. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) US Army (USA) Military Police (MP), 134 Calvary Regiment, Camp Phoenix, AFG made contact with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and led him north down the first floor hallway toward the ACCC room where the shooting took place. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was instructed to post security outside the door of the ACCC room and while standing security approximately 15 ANA soldiers made their way toward him down the hall. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they looked like they were curious and wanted to see inside the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated on individual tried to push past him into the room and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had to physically push the ANA soldier back. An unknown ANA Col noticed the large group of ANA soldiers and told them to leave the hallway, which they did. After a few more moments the Belgian QRF showed up in the hall and secured the hall so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way into the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed the room had a three

tier design with three large steps going up toward the back of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) witnessed a US officer in a tan flight suit (DECEASED BRYANT) and another US officer in the Airman Battle Uniform (ABU) (DECEASED AUSBORN) next to each other in the middle of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then noticed a US civilian (DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN) who between the East wall and a cubicle wall. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then made his way toward the back of the room and saw a blood trail which led to another US officer (DECEASED BRODEUR) in a tan flight suit on the Northwest side of the room. They were all deceased. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he remembered seeing two more US members (DECEASED ESTELLE, DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD) in the Northeast corner of the room as well. After (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way around the room he recalled a group of higher ranking US officers (NFI) entered the room and began planning to move the KIA's out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled seeing shell casings in the rear of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) overheard a conversation between a linguist (later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) and another individual (later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) where the linguist stated he was in the ACCC when the shooting took place and he hid under a table next to the civilian contractor and once the SUBJECT left the room he got up and got away.

2-10 PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I-17 Field Artillery Regiment (FAR), 75th Field Brigade, KAIA, AFG
 Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/Bldg 200, Rm 12, Kabul, AFG
 Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), 24th Expeditionary Field Investigative Squadron (EFIS), Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB), Qatar (QT); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Det 241, AUAB, QT

Exhibit: 5

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the following: On 27 April 2011, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in his office located on the ISAF side of the base in a common area known as the Thunder Lab when SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I-17 FAR, 75th Field Brigade, KAIA, AFG, ordered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to grab his vest and helmet and meet Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) for further instruction. At approximately 1020 hours, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ordered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to secure the north side of the compound. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took his position on the stairs of a tower located in north eastern side of the compound. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled hearing gunshots but could not provide any details of how many, or the sequence of rounds fired.

2-11 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 49th Security Forces Squadron (SFS), Holloman AFB, NM
 Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/Bldg 200 Rm 02, KAIA, AFG
 Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 6

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was friends with DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED AMBARD provided a verbal and signed, sworn statement (attached) which related the following: On 27 Apr 11, at approximately 1000 hours, while (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked outside of her KSPAN (the work and living areas on the Afghan Side of the base) she received a phone call from DECEASED BROWN (Note: The distance between (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) KSPAN and Bldg 101 is approximately one quarter of a mile). DECEASED BROWN screamed through the phone "ACCC guys shooting need help" (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard DECEASED BROWN and perhaps others screaming in the background and heard gunshots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tried to keep DECEASED BROWN on the phone; however, the cell phone battery apparently lost power. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had her M4 on her and quickly loaded a round into the chamber and yelled at personnel located outside to get into their buildings. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started to run towards where she believed DECEASED BROWN was and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, Kabul, AFG; Deployed from 9th Airlift Wing (AW), Dover

AFB, DE, went along with her. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed ANA members running towards her and she decided to head in the direction they came from. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got closer to Bldg 101 and heard what they believed to be shots from an AK-47 and the rounds hitting the flag pole located west of the main entrance of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the Afghan clinic and provided security around the Bldg. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG, deployed from 55th Aerospace Medicine Squadron (AMS), Offutt AFB, NE (refer to paragraph 2-16), and one other unidentified person came out of the clinic and told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that there were wounded Americans inside Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got a team together consisting of Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 SFS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 5 SFS, Minot AFB, ND, MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 96th Civil Engineering Squadron (CES), Altus AFB, OK, and PO3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), KAIA, AFG; Deployed from USS Enterprise CVN (carrier, vessel, nuclear power) 65, and a couple of unknown individuals (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not have body armor on so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stayed within the middle of the team. They approached Bldg 101 from the south and tried to enter the Bldg via the first floor south entrance. The door was padlocked from the inside and the team could not gain access into the Bldg. They went up the staircase located at the southern end of the Bldg and gained access via the second floor south entrance. Once inside Bldg 101 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed a trail of blood on the floor and followed it. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the G-2 intelligence office where the blood stopped, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see anybody inside the room (Note: the ANA QRF had already removed SUBJECT). At that time, Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, HQ ANSF Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG, was inside the Bldg, signaled to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and told her the Americans were downstairs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the team followed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) down the stairs and got in front of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Once downstairs, the team turned and looked down the north hallway and an unknown ANA member signaled the team down the hall. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and her team proceeded down the hallway into the ACCC and the adjacent conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard a team member yell from the ACCC that "they are in here". (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the ACCC and immediately saw two individuals, later identified as DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED AUSBORN lying on the first tier (Note: The room had three step up tiers so the rear of the room was higher than the front of the room). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted DECEASED AUSBORN was dead because of bullet holes within his head. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew DECEASED BRYANT was dead because someone else in the room had checked his vitals (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were in the back of the ACCC and yelled to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) not to go to their location because they found DECEASED BROWN and she had vitals. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) checked the vitals of a body lying on his back near DECEASED BROWN, later identified as DECEASED RANSOM. DECEASED RANSOM did not have any vitals so she grabbed his handgun and placed it within her pocket. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not find DECEASED AMBARD's weapon and believed it was underneath his body. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut DECEASED RANSOM's M4 sling and gave the weapon to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted DECEASED RANSOM had both hands on the M4. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not remember weapons on DECEASED BRYANT or DECEASED AUSBORN but noted an individual, later identified as DECEASED BRODEUR, had an empty holster and DEAN could not locate the handgun at that time. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began to take some form of identification from the deceased individuals so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took as many name tapes as she could find. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) picked DECEASED BROWN up and carried her out the room, down the hallway, out the main entrance and to the Afghan clinic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled DECEASED BROWN had her handgun within her holster when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) carried her out of Bldg 101. On the way to the clinic, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED BROWN was responsive and moved her feet, squeezed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hand and, at one point, looked at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and smiled. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed DECEASED BROWN had been shot twice, once in the head and one in the upper chest. Once at the Afghan clinic, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not get an ambulance to take DECEASED BROWN to the ISAF hospital (Note: The French ambulance was on site but they could not find the ambulance personnel to transport DECEASED BROWN and with little time nobody looked for the drivers) so they found a government owned support utility vehicle (SUV) and put DECEASED BROWN in the rear of the SUV, on a stretcher. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was upfront in the passenger seat with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) driving and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the backseat holding onto DECEASED BROWN as they were unable to close the rear hatch of the SUV due to the length of the stretcher. When the team arrived at the ISAF hospital, medics took DECEASED BROWN.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it was out of the ordinary for DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED AMBARD to be in the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went on to say DECEASED AMBARD sometimes worked with the higher ranking ANA soldiers within Bldg 101 and DECEASED BROWN usually worked from the Communications Bldg. DECEASED BROWN's job was to train the Afghans on how to run a communication helpdesk and fix computer issues. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED AMBARD were in the ACCC to show two individuals, later identified as DECEASED AUSBORN and DECEASED ESTELLE, how a communication encryption system for the ANA worked. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted all deceased personnel had magazines within their weapons except for DECEASED RANSOM's M4, in which a magazine was next to the weapon. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed everyone's handgun was still within their holster.

2-12 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from operating location Air Force Element (AFELM) Joint Flying Training, Training Squadron 31, Navel Air 31, Corpus Christi, TX
Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/KAIA, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 7

(U//FOUO) On 29 Apr 11, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who provided a signed sworn statement (attached) that related the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in attendance for the 1000 hours meeting in the Conference Room located next to the ACCC Operations room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the meeting was running about fifteen minutes late as the 18 to 23 attendees present awaited a call from the MOD. Additionally, the call always initiated the start of the meeting, which would be an integral part of the tasking of flying squadrons for the next day. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed SUBJECT was not at the meeting as of 1015 hours when he last looked at his watch, but it was not unusual for SUBJECT to be late due to the lax culture. SUBJECT was the Cargo and Passenger Management Officer and attended all of the 1000 hours morning scheduling meetings. Other members (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remembered in attendance were as follows: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) POI (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG, deployed from Naval Airfield (NALF) San Clements Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA (refer to para 2-49), Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Planning Division, HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Deputy of Operations, HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Helicopter Maintenance Squadron, KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he did not know all of the people in attendance due to the seating arrangement. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard a gunshot at approximately 1017 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described the first shot as a very loud "POP", followed by a nonstop barrage of gunfire which followed in the next several minutes. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linguist, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (AKA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG, kicked over his seat and fled the room directly after the first shot. About one second later, the second round of shots began, and then it became a constant volley of gunfire. The remaining attendees sitting at the conference table suddenly reacted and surged toward the front entrance of the conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fell over backwards in his chair as he reached for his handgun, which (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said was jammed in his holster due to sand and dirt. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed DECEASED NYLANDER, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 538 AEAS, KAIA, AFG, ran over (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as they exited the room as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tried to charge a bullet into the chamber of his weapon.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had one magazine in his weapon due to the recent implementation of the "Amber" carrying policy (Note: the policy was the weapon could have a full magazine but could not have a round in the chamber). After (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) charged his weapon, he regained his footing and took a tactical position in the corner of the room opposite of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who kept an eye on the adjoining door between the ACCC and Conference room. Approximately 25 to 30 seconds after the initial shot, non-stop gunfire still erupted next door in the ACCC Operations room. After everyone else ran out of the room,

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) departed as well while SUBJECT continued firing shots next door. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined he and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were the only people who drew their weapons inside the conference room.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sprinted out the front door when everybody was out of the conference room except (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and himself. When exiting out the conference room into the hallway, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took a direct left toward the front entrance of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) "lost" (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as he fled the room, but later learned (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took approximately five shots down the hallway toward an Afghan, whom (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) thought had a weapon in his hand upon exiting the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to sprint approximately 100 meters to his work section, the Rotary Bldg. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) still heard rapid gunfire as he arrived back to the Rotary Bldg.

2-13 Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 29 April 11/ Bldg 200, Rm 2, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 8

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) that related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the Director of Operations for the 438 AEAS and as the mentor/pilot to the Afghan Presidential Air Service (PAS). The Afghan PAS provides very important person (VIP) transportation to President HAMID KARZAI and visiting Heads of State.

(U//FOUO) The meetings that occurred the morning of 27 Apr 11, were both scheduled for the first floor in the ACCC ops Center and ACCC conference room. The meeting in the ACCC ops center was for the purpose of planning MI-35 rocket box patrols (security over Kabul city) on 28 April and maximum mentor participation was requested. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was notified of the meeting that morning and stated it is not a recurring meeting. The second meeting in the Air Corps building takes place in the ACCC conference room adjoining to the ops center and occurs daily at 1000 for the purpose of planning out the next day's schedule. Involvement in this meeting is usually 5-7 US mentors and approximately 12-15 Afghans.

(U//FOUO) At approximately 0920 hours, on 29 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reached the Rotary Bldg and began mission planning for an air assault on 28 Apr 11, with ANAF pilots and Croatian mentors. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related at 1030 hours, he heard (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) run into the office with his 9 mm drawn. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) shouted there had been a shooting in the ACCC Operations room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked outside and noticed several people, to include uniformed ANAF, US contractors, and individuals dressed in civilian clothing, moving away from the Air Corps in a panicked state. All personnel filtered into the hallways, closed doors to avoid line of sight from windows, and posted a two-person security team at all six buildings' exits. After security was established, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assumed control of the land mobile radio (LMR) and maintained visibility on Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated individuals began to sporadically come out of Bldg 101 during the next 10-15 minutes and a small Afghan cordon unit set up security around the perimeter. At this time, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed an individual with a long gun on the second floor, third window from the Southwest corner of Bldg 101. Shortly thereafter (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed muzzle flashes and started preparations to possibly deal with barricaded shooter/hot hallway scenarios. Reports of multiple Afghans wounded and one US critical in the Medical Clinic, Bldg 305, saturated the radio net. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 538 AEAS, KAIA, AFG and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in a white van to assist at the clinic due to the delayed QRF response, perceived ineffective Afghan cordon, and urgency of the medical situation.

(U//FOUO) After entering the clinic, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) encountered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who had set up a triage for four Afghans wounded in action (WIA). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked if any of the injuries were critical, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) replied, "No." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered DECEASED NYLANDER was KIA. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately viewed the body, which was under armed guard control, uncovered the blanket and confirmed no vital signs/no pulse and noticed a single gunshot wound to the left rear of the skull with no exit wound. At that time, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) moved back to the Afghan patients while several other US soldiers prepped DECEASED NYLANDER's body to relocate to make room for potential casualties. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then consulted via cell phone with Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 52 AMS, Spangdahlem AB, Germany, who requested DECEASED NYLANDER's body be transported to the French hospital as soon as possible. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) departed Bldg 305 with DECEASED NYLANDER, his IDs and weapon.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reached the open gate at approximately 5 mph, dismounted, and placed his hands in the air and shouted, "US critical patient." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) performed this action to dissuade being misperceived as possessing a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) since the airport was now on high alert and guards were likely to react to uncharacteristic behavior. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated Emergency Room (ER) doctors promptly unloaded DECEASED NYLANDER from the vehicle after (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reached the hospital, but they were unable to resuscitate DECEASED NYLANDER in the ER.

(U//FOUO) From this point, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) monitored the situation from either the ISAF hospital or Kabul Command post. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned shortly after delivering DECEASED NYLANDER to the ER there was a second patient inbound, identified as DECEASED BROWN. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard over the LMR that five Americans, identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered Bldg 101 upon learning from exiting Afghans there were still Americans inside. Their initial actions were to begin clearing the Bldg until an ANAF soldier gestured to them where the Americans were located. They located several bodies and only one critical patient in the ACCC. While pulling ID cards off the KIA, the Fire team found a responsive DECEASED BROWN and ultimately delivered her to the ISAF hospital with weak vitals. DECEASED BROWN expired shortly after admittance to the ER primarily due to a fatal gunshot wound to the back of the head.

(U//FOUO) After all the KIA arrived at the Afghan hospital, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began the task of cataloging personal effects and acquiring weapons from the hospital armory for later exploitation. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW/CV, KAIA, AFG, subsequently appointed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as the weapons custodian to ensure safe storage of all firearms and weapons throughout the investigation process.

(U//FOUO) In addition to the signed, sworn statement, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally related the following information: At no time did (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observe another potential shooter exit Bldg 101, although he admitted it would be impossible to differentiate between who was who at a range of approximately 300 meters (the distance from Bldg 101 to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Bldg, referred to as the Rotary Bldg). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related it would have been very easy for an additional enemy to exit the scene, as it was nearly 15 minutes after the initial shots before any effective perimeter defense was established.

2-14 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 440 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 755th Intelligence Materiel Squadron, Wright-Patterson, AFB, OH
Date/Place: 30 Apr 11 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, Kabul, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 9

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided two signed, sworn statements (attached) detailing the following: On 27 Apr 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attended the 1000 hours scheduling meeting held at Bldg 101 on the ANAF compound in the ACCC Conference Room. Inside the meeting (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DECEASED NYLANDER and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat in his seat for approximately five minutes and heard what sounded like gunshots coming from the ACCC next door to the conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stood up and drew his 9 mm Beretta pistol, chambered a round and put the weapon on fire. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) covered the door which connects the ACCC Conference Room and the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had his weapon trained on the door while all the personnel located in the room began to run out into the hallway and out the main exit of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) backed out of the conference room toward the main conference room exit and met (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who also had his weapon drawn. They both exited into the hallway and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately pointed his weapon North down the hallway to cover the main entrance of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated an Afghan male approximately 5'9-5'10 about 200 lbs (later identified as SUBJECT) exited the ACCC into the hallway with what appeared to be a weapon in his hand. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fired approximately eight rounds from his weapon. Before he fired, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed DECEASED NYLANDER standing next to him; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed DECEASED NYLANDER fired shots as well. After the individual in the hallway fell to the ground, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned and ran down the hallway and out the main exit of the building and ran to the MXG (NFI), building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally stated he thought DECEASED NYLANDER was running behind him out of the building as well.

2-15 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW/Operations, KAIA, AFG
 Date/Place: 1 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, Kabul, AFG
 Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 10

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained the day to day operations of the ACCC room located in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated mentors have worked with the Afghans for approximately three years trying to teach them basic computer skills and functions of day to day operations of military aircraft movement. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed the mentors had made no real progress until recently. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived to KAIA, AFG on 29 Jan 2011 and up to early Apr 2011 there was little to no improvement to the operations at the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed the removal of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the former (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and replacement of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) in early Apr 11 changed the mindset of the Afghans he and the other mentors worked with. The ACCC provided operational control of flights and cargo transported in and out of the KAIA. The mentors normally consisted of flight officers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO's) and their linguists. They assisted the ANA members with monitoring what was allowed to fly and not fly due to weight, space and availability. The ACCC cancelled flights if they do not meet the mission requirements. Many ANA officers opposed the restrictions that came out of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed there was a lot of corruption because the aircraft whose flight the ACCC cancelled could call any high ranking Afghan and their flight would go out at the last minute. The Afghan would then receive money for the change; it was a business to them. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined the standup and monitoring of flights by the ACCC would hurt some Afghan's monetary gain and cause them tension. The mentors started to enforce the rules made by Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG and DECEASED BRYANT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED BRYANT trained efficiency, transparency, and effectiveness. DECEASED BRYANT talked about threatening to take away fuel for the planes if the ANA would not cooperate with the rules set by the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related, as of 30 Apr 11, no one has taken fuel away. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related, on 11 April 2011, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG had a meeting with the ANA key workers (NFI). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed the meeting regarding changes that would affect the ACCC mission. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not provide any further information on the meeting. The following day, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed considerable changes in the ANA soldiers who worked in the ACCC. The workers worked and applied the lessons taught by the mentors in the past and worked the entire day (before the meeting the office personnel worked from 0830 hours to lunch and did not return until the following day). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not provide any information pertaining to SUBJECT's daily interaction besides attending the 1000 hours

daily meeting. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did state that if the ACCC enforced the rules and had the ability to cancel flights, it could impact SUBJECT's income if he took payments for arranging flight and cargo movements.

2-16 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from, 55 AMS, Offutt AFB, NE
Date/Place: 1 May 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 11

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a first responder to Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard shots at approximately 1000 hours which prompted him to set up security around the Medical Clinic, located approximately 100 meters to the southeasterly direction from Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was at the clinic triaging bodies as they came in from the mass shooting. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed people jumping out of the windows and realized the severity of the situation. After he verified the status of the first four casualties, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) grabbed an Afghan body armor vest and left for the Bldg 101 to help since he heard there were possibly several Americans injured. Upon arrival at the rear of Bldg 101 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw DECEASED NYLANDER lying on the ground outside Bldg 101 rear entrance. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dragged DECEASED NYLANDER approximately 200 yards to an ambulance. The ambulance transported DECEASED NYLANDER to the Afghan Medical Clinic adjacent to Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) performed resuscitation efforts in the ambulance and at the clinic. Medical personnel pronounced DECEASED NYLANDER dead at 1034 hours. DECEASED NYLANDER's body was placed in the records room in the clinic and guarded by MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from, USAF Expeditionary Center, Ft. Dix, NJ in an effort to make room for more casualties.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated ANA soldiers brought SUBJECT, unresponsive, to the hospital in his uniform. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut SUBJECT's uniform off his body and subsequently attempted life saving measures such as chest compressions and intubation; but failed to obtain an airway, and pronounced SUBJECT dead at 1100 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified three shots in SUBJECT's chest and one shot in the left forearm area.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) decided to go back Bldg 101 and attempted to retrieve more Americans. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) accompanied (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on his second body retrieval mission. The fire team entered the ACCC room and noticed what appeared to be bodies lying "all over." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) scanned the room and determined seven of the eight victims were dead. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard breathing from the right rear corner of the room and ran back to discover a living female (DECEASED BROWN), and two deceased males (DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated there were three large pools of blood, one which came from DECEASED BROWN and the others from DECEASED AMBARD and DECEASED RANSOM, both of whom lay directly next to DECEASED BROWN on the floor. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) picked up DECEASED BROWN and placed her on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) shoulders to carry DECEASED BROWN from the Bldg en route to the ambulance where she was placed on a litter. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed DECEASED BROWN's right side was still functional, but her left side was completely limp. DECEASED BROWN had a pulse and a strong grip on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hand while in the ambulance during the ride to the clinic. Upon arrival to the Medical Clinic, DECEASED BROWN's grip weakened and she let go of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hand. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut off DECEASED BROWN's ABU uniform as resuscitation efforts began and medical personnel administered epinephrine in efforts to revive DECEASED BROWN. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed apparent gunshot wounds to the back upper left shoulder region and the left rear of the neck. DECEASED BROWN responded positively to the medication, regained a pulse, and immediately grabbed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arm. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated DECEASED BROWN had no visible weapons throughout her

transport from Bldg 101 to the Medical Clinic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) transported DECEASED BROWN to the ISAF Hospital along with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 440 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 58th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Kirtland AFB, NM, and TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 732nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Moody AFB, GA, proceeded back to Bldg 101 to the ACCC where they found two more DECEASED that they missed on their prior response (DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN and DECEASED ESTELLE). Both individuals were in the right front of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) wrote "7 KIA" in ink along with his name on the entry door to show that someone was already performing the emergency response. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a response from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who stated there was a possibility of "bombs" being in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) replied to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and relayed the number of KIA and subsequently left Bldg 101 en route for the Afghan clinic. Upon return to the clinic, all US personnel were ordered to report to the Thunder Lab for accountability and decompression.

2-17 Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Helicopter Maintenance Squadron, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 1 May 11/ G-2 Office, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 12

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following information in a statement (attached): On 27 Apr 2011, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attended the scheduling meeting and sat next to his mentor, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). A few minutes into the conversation they heard gunshots. Initially the shots confused everyone then rapid gunfire began and everyone got out of their seats and began running toward the conference room door. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said when they heard the shots, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stood up, drew his weapon and covered the door that joins the conference room and the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the conference room together and once they got to the hallway, they ran side by side out of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to the flight line and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to his unit. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not shoot his weapon in the hallway. (Note: The investigation, through interviews and forensic evidence, supported (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) account of his actions during the shooting. It is possible (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had already fired his weapon when he departed Bldg 101 with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

2-18 TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 1 May 11/KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Joint Counterintelligence Unit Afghanistan (JCIU-A), Bagram Airfield (BAF), AFG

Exhibit: 13

(U//FOUO) In a written statement (attached) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) an Intelligence Air Advisor, relayed the following information: On 27 April 2011 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked in the Wing Operations Center (WOC) at KAIA. While in the WOC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) operated the radios and monitored radio traffic during the incident. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a copy of the log (attached) he kept. The log shows the call-signs for the individuals involved in the events of 27 Apr 11.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally provided the following information: He stated he heard multiple reports over the radio about three unidentified individuals that were running around the ANAF compound. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had made one radio call in which he stated he believed there was more than one shooter. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made this statement in conjunction with his radio call at 1120 hours when he advised he cleared Bldg 100. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also provided the name of an individual who may have more information on

the incident, Intelligence Specialist Third Class (IS3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Intelligence Advisor, 451st AEW, KAF, AFG.

2-19 Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 1 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 5, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

Exhibit: 14

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JCIU-A, KAIA, AFG interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) an US advisor for the ANAF compound. Although (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not in Bldg 101 at the time of the shooting, he provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the events of 27 April 2011.

2-20 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Planning Division, HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA AFG
Date/Place: 1 May 11/Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), JCIU-A, BAF, AFG

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was SUBJECT's office supervisor and co-worker with DECEASED BRYANT, DECEASED BROEDUR, and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN, provided the following information: While he prepared for the conference he heard one gunshot followed by several more in rapid succession. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed all the shots came from the same weapon. He thought the door was open about 18 inches and noted he heard no noise come from the room until the shooting started. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated everyone in the conference room initially froze in place and then took off running out the main conference room door. The group from the conference went left out the door and continued down the hallway and again turned left; running away from the Bldg's main entrance and exiting the Bldg through the back door. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way to a nearby Bldg, called MOD, and informed them someone compromised their security. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT was a pilot and he had known him for 20 years. They had graduated the Afghan Air Force Military Academy together. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT did not follow the normal military standards; he was irresponsible, stubborn, and insistent. He would get mad if things were not going his way. The two had a break in contact because of being in different locations. SUBJECT was assigned to his current post 10 months prior and Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had noticed drastic changes in SUBJECT's way of life. He had become more religious and had drastic changes in his Islamic views. It appeared SUBJECT's views were boiling over and extreme to an extent. Even with these changes, SUBJECT would look at pornographic materials on the internet. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it was not normal for ANAF Officers to get issued a pistol right away, but SUBJECT obtained a pistol within four months of his arrival (Note: Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANSF, KAIA, AFG, confirmed SUBJECT was issued his weapon and ammunition, ref para 2-62) . Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) restated this was not normal. SUBJECT would come and go as he pleased and was not a punctual person. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) felt, because of these actions, SUBJECT could have possibly had "top cover" from a higher ranking officer in the MOD. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew SUBJECT attended a Mosque on Second Street in Damien District (NFI). (Note: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not name who the Mullah was because he did not attend that Mosque and referred to the Mosque location as on 2nd street because house or Bldg numbers are not normal for that area, only street numbers). The Mullah in this Mosque was extremely anti-American and pro-Pakistan. SUBJECT always drove to work and on the day of the shooting, SUBJECT did not drive to work. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further explained SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had called ANAF Internal Affairs office on multiple occasions informing them SUBJECT was mentally and financially unstable. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know the name of SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI).

2-21 Re-Interview of Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 1 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JCIU-A, Kabul, AFG

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following information: Everyday a video teleconference with the MOD was held to update MOD on the ANAF flying status. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated at 0950 hours they had experienced technical problems and resorted to having just a teleconference instead. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated while he prepared for the conference he heard one gunshot followed by several more in rapid succession.

2-22 PO3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 2 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 15

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a Public Affairs Advisor, responded to Bldg 101 with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the events of 27 April 2011. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) statement provided no new pertinent information to the investigation.

2-23 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 2 May 11/Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the assistance of Cultural Advisor (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JCIU-A Kabul Team, KAIA, AFG, provided the following information: Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the Officer in Charge of Transportation Control Curriculum, stated he was not at work on 27 Apr 2011. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he received pay the day before so he was accomplishing chores at home and running errands around town. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not know SUBJECT very well. The only personal information Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew about the SUBJECT was he had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). On a professional level, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT appeared to be unusual and reserved. SUBJECT would say hello to everyone to include the US mentors, while other ANAF members would joke around, conduct small talk and "high five" the mentors. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added SUBJECT was not disrespectful just quiet toward the mentors. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he believed SUBJECT had a connection to a terrorist cell because the attack was too coordinated to be a random act. In the limited contact with SUBJECT, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not notice any indications of changes in SUBJECT.

2-24 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 2 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 16

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a scheduler, provided a hand written statement (attached) that provided the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the ACCC working next to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). While (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked at his desk, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard four gunshots and immediately (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dropped under a desk to hide. SUBJECT fired shots around the room and turned toward (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and fired one shot at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) which struck the ground next to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) face.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know how many shots SUBJECT fired and did not hear him reload. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT left the room; at which point, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran out of the room and across the hall to the bathroom. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran into the ACCC conference room and exited through the window. As (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the room he witnessed what he believed to be a body of a Lt Col (later identified as

DECEASED NYLANDER) and did not see any other victims. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said normally there were three to four mentors in the ACCC on any given day. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described SUBJECT as the type of person who was a loner and would greet people but not have any discussions with people. SUBJECT was always late and never made it to work at the prescribed start time of 0700 hours.

2-25 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 2 May 11/ HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Deputy of Operations, provided the following information: Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was an ANAF helicopter pilot since approximately 1983, and moved to the KAIA base approximately two and a half years earlier. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he had known SUBJECT since he entered the ANAF in 1983 but stayed away from SUBJECT due to SUBJECT's frequent use of hashish (marijuana). Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided SUBJECT was a very vibrant and happy person in his younger years but since SUBJECT moved to his post at KAIA, approximately five to six months earlier, SUBJECT became very quiet and generally kept to himself. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) only had professional contact with SUBJECT since his arrival at KAIA. SUBJECT displayed no disrespect, hostility nor arrogance toward his Coalition Forces (CF) mentors that Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) witnessed. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not elaborate on SUBJECT's personality or changes in his recent behavior because his contact was purely professional and very brief. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided he last saw SUBJECT on 26 Apr 11. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT displayed nothing out of the ordinary and attended the regularly scheduled video teleconference with the MOD. SUBJECT presented his portion of the material for that briefing.

2-26 SMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 87 Medical Group (MG), McGuire AFB, NJ
Date/Place: 2 May 11/Bldg 101, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 17

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) with the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) volunteered to recover Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG, from their location near the scene and bring them back to the 438 AEW Bldg, known as KSPAN3. Upon arrival to the ANSF side of the base, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who relayed there were seven confirmed dead Americans on scene.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to the crime scene and noted the following details: There were Afghan military members surrounding the entrance to ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated file cabinets and desks were scattered around. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED AUSBORN lay dead, with gunshot wounds to the head. Immediately to the left and on the next level of the three-tiered floor was DECEASED BRODEUR also with a gunshot to the head. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued and related directly to the right and still on the second tier was DECEASED ESTELLE, who was behind a desk. DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN was between the desk and the wall. Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID) informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN had a gunshot wound to his ribcage. DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD were on the top level. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related medical personnel pronounced DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD at approximately 1600 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left the ACCC to set up a recovery team.

2-27 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 52 AMS, Spangdahlem AB, GE

